Negotiations between the U.S. and Iraqi governments over a new agreement to give legal cover to the American occupation have run into serious problems. While neither side may want to carry this confrontation to a rupture at this point, the contradictions behind this clash are very real.
On 24 October, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki unexpectedly announced that he would not sign the draft treaty that his negotiators had already agreed to and initialled. The U.S. responded by declaring it would not accept any major changes. If this deadlock continues, the U.S. may ask the United Nations Security Council to renew the current year-to-year UN mandate for the occupation that the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement was supposed to replace. So far, Maliki has been reluctant to accept this step because the mandate explicitly places Iraq under complete American control. Renewing it would be seen as a sign that there has been no change in the humiliated status of the country and the subordination of its regime.
The new top U.S. commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, belligerently accused Iran of "paying off" the Iraqi cabinet to block the agreement. He threatened to halt all military operations on 31 December if the Iraqi government doesn't give in, and sent it a three-page list of dozens of other drastic steps the U.S. would take, like effectively grounding all air traffic, halting economic support and cutting off protection of the country's sea shipping, land borders and oil pipelines. His boss, Admiral Mike Mullen, head of the U.S. armed forces, warned that if the Iraqi government did not reverse course, "there is a great potential for losses of significant consequences. " (McClatchy Newspapers, 24 October)
In order to see the real character of this conflict, first we have to peel off the layers of hypocrisy.
First there is the question of the legality of the occupation under international law. The United Nations refused to authorize the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. It was not until June 2004, after the U.S. had taken over the country and seemed to be imposing its will, that the European countries that had opposed the invasion decided they had to accept the reality of the occupation if they wanted to pursue their own imperialist interests in the region. So there's a paradox: Since the invasion was illegal under international law, how can the occupation that resulted from that invasion now be legal? (Not to mention the political false pretences used to justify it – Saddam Hussein's "weapons of mass destruction" .) All the talk about "legal cover" is about just that – a cover for the fact that in this imperialist world naked power relations and interests are what ultimately matter.
The second point concerns the intentions of both sides. Despite Washington's show of honouring the "sovereign" government whose establishment it engineered, the treaty debacle alone is enough to demonstrate that the U.S. intends to keep on dictating in Iraq. It also demonstrates this Iraqi government whose rise they engineered may not be a bunch of puppets but is far from sovereign. It is dependent on the U.S. occupation it says it wants to end. If American troops suddenly "do nothing", as General Odierno threatened, the Maliki government might not have much of a leg to stand on.
Consider the draft of agreement itself. Whose interests does it reflect? The two most contentious issues are these: It would allow the U.S. to maintain major bases and forces in Iraq until the end of 2011 – and even after that if the Iraqi government agrees. American soldiers would be guaranteed immunity from Iraqi law, allowing them to continue murdering people on a mass scale and raping at will, except when off-duty and off-base.
It is extremely revealing that the U.S. pushed for total immunity with no exceptions until the last minute, and then imposed a clause that even in this restricted category of crimes, a joint U.S.-Iraqi commission would have to agree that the soldier involved could be taken before an Iraqi court. U.S. soldiers rarely venture outside of their bases while not on a mission. But the thought of even one American soldier hauled before an Iraqi court is more than American commanders and the whole U.S. political establishment can stomach. A former U.S. Marine officer explained on Al Jazeera that such perceived degradation would become "a recruiting issue" and grievously damage soldiers' morale – from the immoral point of view of the subjugation mission the U.S. sent them to Iraq to accomplish. There's some logic to that. How can an occupation army's soldiers be judged by the occupied?
The fact is that that after nine months of secret negotiations, Maliki's government had accepted these clauses. In fact, he has never given the U.S. anything but. a free hand since he took office in 2006. Why, then, has this friction arisen? Basically because of the way the U.S. has shifted its aims and strategy in Iraq in response to both the evolution of the situation there and even more its broader intentions.
After a relative lull following the invasion, the U.S. faced fierce military resistance that to a large extent gathered under the banner of Sunni Islamic fundamentalism (Salafism). Some forces called themselves "Al Qaeda in Iraq", principally a home-grown phenomenon according to serious observers. In response, the U.S. encouraged a campaign of mass terror and ethnic murder against Sunnis, spearheaded by the Iraqi Interior Ministry under the control of the governing Shia parties. Sunni guerrillas themselves carried out equally disgusting murders of Shia civilians, calling them apostates (traitors to the faith), as bad or worse than the invaders. Especially after the bombing of the Al-Askari Shia shrine in February 2006, full-scale civil war raged between Sunni and Shia communities – all the political parties and forces.
The "surge" of additional U.S. troops over the last year was a response to a situation escaping control due to a civil war the U.S. had done much to encourage. But the results changed the political landscape in ways the U.S. had probably not foreseen. The Shiites won the civil war in Baghdad, taking over contested areas and forcing out Sunni families. At the same time, "Al Qaeda in Iraq" ran into a wall due to the inherent limitations of an ideology and programme that do not even seek to unite the people against the occupier and a social vision many Iraqis have found unacceptable.
The U.S. has not been standing idly by. Taking advantage of the inherent contradictions the Al Qaeda movement was running into, the conflict between jihadis and traditional tribal leaders whose authority they threatened, and the genocidal pressure on Sunnis from the U.S.'s Shia allies as well, and now wielding both more troops and, more importantly, a different political strategy, American generals were able to achieve a major success: they turned 100,000 Sunni fighters, a great many of whom had been doing their best to kill the occupiers, into at least temporary U.S. allies. When their leaders signed up to be on the U.S. payroll, many turned out to be former generals and other officers from Saddam Hussein's army and members of his Baathist party.
One fine morning, these men "woke up to millions of dollars in [U.S.] government assistance and the support of the [American] 3rd Infantry Division," a senior U.S. official told The New York Times (24 October). The U.S. was offering this "Awakening" movement more than amnesty, better arms and huge amounts of money. It was also dangling in front of their eyes the possibility of regaining their lost paradise when they helped rule Iraq under Saddam.
It would be wrong to think that the fundamentalist ideology predominant in the Sunni movement has mainly been a vehicle for something else (like some twisted nationalism, as some people insist), rather than seeing it as a major driving force in itself. It's likely that even for the formerly secular Saddam cadre who embraced it, this was more a case of an opportune religion than religious opportunism. Saddam himself in his last years traded Baathist "Arab socialism" for Allah. This ideology and the class forces and social relations it is based on will persist in various political and military manifestations. So will the sectarian tensions on all sides.
Nevertheless, the western province of Al-Anbar, where the Marines stared into the face of defeat at the hands of "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" in 2006, is now considered one of the most stable parts of Iraq.
David Petraeus, the highly political general in charge of bringing about this shift, recently went on to head the American military throughout the greater Middle East, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Some years ago he told journalist Patrick Cockburn that the secret of success in Anbar province would be "not to align too closely with one ethnic group, political party, tribe, religious group or social element." (The Independent, 14 September). This is precisely what he did – he betrayed the U.S.'s closest allies, the Shia and Kurdish parties, by bringing back their most murderous enemies, while at the same playing each of them off against the others, using the political and ideological weaknesses of all these often feudal reactionaries against them. As an English lord once said in another context, imperialists have no permanent friends, only permanent interests.
The most important factor conditioning this shift was the increasing collision course between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The two main Shia parties in government, the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq and Maliki's much smaller Dawa party, have both been tied to the Iranian regime. So, in a different way, is the Shia fundamentalist movement of Moqtada Sadr, which supported Maliki before going into the opposition. Despite Sadr's claims to Iraqi nationalism, his Mahdi Army was at the forefront of the ethnic cleansing of Sunni communities in Baghdad. Unlike the Supreme Council whose core support comes from traditional merchants, Sadr's movement draws heavily on slum dwellers. But a reactionary party based on poor masses is no less reactionary. Ideologically, the movement is now closer than the mainstream parties to the Iranian regime and its conception of "the rule of the jurisprudent" (direct clerical rule). Sadr himself is said to be in the Iranian holy city of Qom, studying to advance his clerical status. While putting pressure on the U.S. to leave (and according to the American authorities, in the past engaging in ambushes and other attacks on occupation soldiers), most of the time the Sadr movement has strenuously avoided direct confrontation with the U.S. – a position it also shares with the Iranian regime.
Again, unintended consequences can be amazing: the assemblage of forces the U.S. threw together, probably improvising, to help it run Iraq are to a very large degree tied to Iran. The U.S.'s awakening of the seeming corpse of Saddam's army, again apparently in improvisation, has deepened the fears of Maliki and others in his coalition (and the Kurds) that the U.S. cannot be trusted and that their political and even physical lives are at stake. This, of course, only makes them more reluctant to break their ties with Iran. Earlier this year, Maliki made a huge fuss about sending his soldiers – with American support – into Basra and other cities controlled by Sadr to bring them back under central government control. They ran into so much trouble that Maliki had to turn to Iran to broker a compromise. Sadr ordered his men to fade away rather than fight. This, Maliki's greatest "success", as it was touted by Bush spokesmen at the time, seems to have been more than the U.S. could stand. How could the U.S. turn over even much fake sovereignty to a government so needy of Iran?
It only stands to reason that Maliki suddenly took offence at the clause in the draft agreement that would allow U.S. troops to stay in Iraq indefinitely, even after 2011, if the Iraqi government agreed. The government of Iraq as it is presently configured may no longer exist by then. Conversely, such a clause might give the U.S. all the more incentive to do to Maliki and his pals what they famously did to Ngo Dinh Diem, the South Vietnamese tyrant whom the U.S. first put in office and later found it necessary to murder in 1963. (Supposedly this prompted Mao Tsetung to remark, "It's no fun being a running dog.")
Under these circumstances, Maliki probably thought it best to revive his alliance with the Sadr movement or at least guard his flanks against accusations of national betrayal. The widespread American idea that the "surge" and the U.S. army's retaking of the Sadr City slums in Baghdad marked the death of the Sadr movement is greatly exaggerated. His Mahdi Army was never really an army, in the sense of a disciplined, trained and coherent organization. It is a social movement, one of the most powerful in Iraq, along with the Kurdish parties and Sunni fundamentalism, and like them, it is not going to go away. On 18 October, the streets of Sadr City were filled to overflowing in a demonstration demanding that the Status of Forces Agreement not be renegotiated but repudiated. This is also the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (Tehran Times, 22 October). U.S. General Odierno called Iran-backed fighters a "long-term threat" and "what I worry about most." (Washington Post, 13 October)
Developments in Iraq have been a lesson in unpredictability, but the contradictions at work are pretty clear. Former U.S. diplomat Peter W. Galbraith, points out, "Less violence, however, is not the same thing as success. The United States did not go to war in Iraq for the purpose of ending violence between contending sectarian forces. Success has to be measured against U.S. objectives." (New York Review of Books, 23 October) This is the only scientific way to judge the situation in Iraq today.
Galbraith works with the leadership of the two Kurdish parties and tends to view the situation through their eyes, which doesn't make him any less an informed observer. He writes about the Kurdish leadership, "Both militarily and politically, they have supported the U.S. policy, even when they have had reservations about its wisdom." Now they are the only major political forces in Iraq calling for the signing of the draft treaty – or, in other words, happy with the status quo. Iraq's Kurdish President Jalal Talabani recent went to Tehran to dissuade Iran from opposing it. As Galbraith describes it, the U.S.'s only reliable allies (despite their own historical ties to the Iranian regime) are frightened. In areas outside of historical Kurdistan their Peshmerga troops occupy, especially, now, Mosul, they find themselves under attack from both Sunni fundamentalists and the very government Talabani is supposed to be president of. The U.S. military has already said that they will not "take sides" in these circumstances, which is especially striking since the Peshmerga occupied these towns along with and at the request of the U.S. during the invasion. Galbraith is very pessimistic about the future value of any alliance with the occupiers.
It is undeniable that the U.S. has pushed back most of the active armed resistance to the occupation in past months, as reflected in the diminished number of American military casualties. Yet General Petraeus, speaking as he was about to leave Iraq for his new job, warned that American gains are "fragile" and "not irreversible" . "This is not the sort of struggle where you take a hill, plant the flag and go home to a victory parade," he said. The situation is even more fragile in terms of the U.S. mission. As Galbraith says so bitterly, the U.S.'s political goal has never been to prevent Iraqis from being killed. Nor has it been fewer deaths of its own soldiers, although that helps make the occupation more palatable to some people. The purpose of the war has been to gain political and economic control of Iraq, and to do so not as an end in itself but as a step toward hegemony in the whole broader Middle East, which requires confronting the Iranian regime and Islamic fundamentalism of all varieties.
Neither part of that goal seems any closer now, and in seeking to achieve it the U.S. is likely to unleash much more violence.
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